
It has often been said that if you’ve seen one port, you’ve seen one port. And not too long ago the security standards and protocols of ports around the world were as varied and different as the terminal companies and operators working within them. No two ports viewed security in the same light and no two ports believed they had the same security concerns. However, the advent of the International Maritime Organization-crafted International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS), the United States Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) and other international regulations has given ports a much-needed commonality of purpose by establishing sound security standards used throughout the world. Where at one time we in the security industry were too often confronted with a myopic attitude toward security, suddenly security has become a core component not only to port operations, but also to port budgetary requirements.
Of particular note within the ISPS Code is the introduction of comprehensive access control procedures that have significantly reduced the occurrence of security breaches at ports worldwide. Prior to the ISPS Code, it was not uncommon to see an importer clearing his cargo on the dock while his children roamed unescorted around the terminal, or to witness a suspicious gang of men lingering around an open container. Now, those same ports require proof of identification, purpose of visit and guests are accompanied by an escort. Security awareness of non-security personnel at ports has also had an enormous impact on security. Port facility security officers now can utilize hundreds of sets of eyes to assist in maintaining the safety and security of their facility. ISPS Code required training has given port personnel the tools to identify suspicious behavior and react appropriately to security incidents.
Communications
Communication with vessels and the handling of cargo has also improved under the ISPS Code. Routine inspection of cargo, with variation of inspection intensity depending on the threat level, has helped support security throughout the entire supply chain. While these initiatives within the ISPS Code have been integral in improving port security, we now find ourselves three years removed from implementation and it seems a general mood of complacency has set in. Port facilities are now compliant – fences are up, guards are in place, people are trained, plans are approved and certificates are on the wall. Now what? Well, to many that is enough. We are of course fortunate that no major incident has impacted the maritime industry in the past few years, most of which we can attribute to the ISPS Code. But with this lull in security-related incidents comes the belief by many companies that they’ve spent enough, built enough and done enough.
Do we need to spend more money to avoid complacency? Certainly not, but I would suggest as the ISPS Code comes up on its five-year review that emphasis be put on providing ports with ideas and resources for keeping their facility and personnel active and alert. Another issue the IMO would benefit from addressing is the reliance on the Contracting Governments, particularly in developing or impoverished nations, to approve and certify their own country’s ports as ISPS compliant. Countries are reluctant to threaten their own economy by denying a port its ISPS certification. The international port community would be more assured of universal compliance if independent entities were charged with verifying ISPS compliance around the world.
Lastly, the ability to share accurate, real-time information is a topic of much discussion. While governments continue to push for collaboration and cooperation – as with Australia and India recently agreeing to increase their levels of maritime information sharing – the maritime industry, it would seem, still must rely on bits of unsubstantiated information they acquire from various sources and must deal with governments still engaged in ‘trickling down’ filtered intelligence. In the United States, Deputy Secretary of the US Department of Homeland Security Michael Jackson has said that the next step in supply chain security must include a “global trade exchange” – one that will provide data warehouses to collect and share information. While the scope of such information exchange, particularly within the trade community, is daunting, it is perhaps a sign that governments are ready to embrace the essential need for industry support.
The overall package
A European or US port is only as safe as the incoming vessels last port of call and the cargo’s last inspection, and so without proper communication and information throughout the supply chain, ports will continue to be vulnerable to threats and breaches in security. Yet any information collected is useless if it does not reach the port or vessel that needs it most and if the information is simply inaccurate. It is essential therefore that industry develop information sharing and analysis centers that engage maritime security analysts to collect information from initial sources, dissect the information to support the concept of anonymity, utilize additional sources to verify the information and disseminate the intelligence to maritime participants.
Imagine the advantage if each port a vessel calls on is connected through an information-sharing center, alerting ports along the chain about suspicious behavior, inaccurate documentation or real-time evidence of a terrorist threat.
Additionally, these industry-led information-sharing centers can offer several economic advantages to the industry. Acts of terrorism and crime cost money – whether through investing in additional manpower, the delay of vessels and cargo or the damaging of a company’s reputation. With the right information, these costs can be avoided. Customer confidence will increase as security breaches become less frequent and there could even be the potential for lower insurance premiums as insurers begin to see a reduction in risk. The ISPS Code has enhanced and standardized port security throughout the world. It has had an enormously positive impact on protecting trade lanes and deterring terrorism and crime. It is essential however that we in the industry remain vigilant, avoid complacency and recognize the advantage that can be had by sharing threat information across the industry.
The MSC is a 20-year-old non-profit organization that is devoted solely to international maritime security issues by advocating with government agencies on behalf of the industry and by providing threat information sharing and security training support to its membership.
What does implementing the ISPS Code involve?
Ship and port facility security is a risk management activity and, as with all risk management efforts, the most effective course of action is to eliminate the source of the threat. However, as eliminating the source of the threat (those that would commit acts of terrorism or otherwise threaten the security of ships or port facilities) is essentially a government function, 100 percent security is an aim but cannot be guaranteed – hence the risk reduction approach to lessen possibilities to the lowest practicable level.
In order to determine what security measures are appropriate, Governments must assess the threat and evaluate the risk of a potential unlawful act. The ISPS Code provides a standardized, consistent framework for managing risk and permitting the meaningful exchange and evaluation of information between contracting governments, companies, port facilities and ships.
Because each ship and each port facility is subject to different threats, the method by which they will meet the specific requirements of the ISPS Code will be determined and eventually approved by the administration or contracting government, as the case may be.
In order to communicate the threat at a port facility or for a ship and to initiate the appropriate response actions, the contracting government must set the appropriate security level. The security level creates a link between the ship and the port facility, since it triggers the implementation of appropriate security measures for the ship and for the port facility.
As threat increases, the only logical counteraction is to reduce vulnerability. The ISPS Code provides several ways to reduce vulnerabilities. Each ship and each port facility will have to determine the measures needed to intensify its security measures to appropriately offset the threat by reducing its vulnerability.